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Abstract: 
This paper defines truth commission impact as the effect of truth commissions on 
government policy, judicial processes and social norms. It isolates impact from the causal 
effects of similar post-conflict institution-building and other transitional justice and 
conflict resolution measures. It examines ten causal mechanisms through which truth 
commissions are expected to influence politics and society. Immediate political impact 
through the implementation of recommendations and delayed political impact through 
civil society mobilization are the two explanations that draw strong empirical support. 
Some commissions contribute to human rights accountability (judicial impact), and some 
promote impunity through amnesty, although the magnitude of impact is small in each 
case. They also generate normative changes through the delegitimation of perpetrators, the 
reaction to delegitimation on the part of perpetrators and their allies, and commissions’ 
overall impact on social norms. Only one commission (in El Salvador) has successfully 
lobbied for vetting. Despite widely held claims that commissions present a trade-off 
between reconciliation and justice, there is no evidence that commissions forge 
reconciliation through consensus, or that they perpetuate impunity. 
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Truth Commission Impact: An Assessment of How Commissions 
Influence Politics and Society 
 
Introduction 
In what ways do truth commissions influence policy and social attitudes? The transitional 
justice literature suggests various mechanisms through which truth commissions are expected to 
achieve a set of moral and political objectives in peace-building and democratization contexts. 
However, only a handful of studies have explored the commission and post-commission 
processes to assess hypotheses of truth commission impact. Taking my cue from this gap in the 
literature, I explain whether or not, and the specific ways in which, truth commissions in fact 
transform the lessons from history into policy, human rights accountability and changes in shared 
social norms. 
I define truth commission impact as the effect of truth commissions on government 
policy, judicial processes and social norms, operating independently of the simultaneous effects 
of post-conflict institution-building, as well as other transitional justice and conflict resolution 
measures. I isolate truth commission impact from such causal influences with a two-step research 
strategy: first, I identify all plausible causal explanations of how truth commissions are likely to 
produce impact, and second, I assess those explanations in light of empirical evidence from all 
transitional truth commission experiences. I show that some of the taken-for-granted 
explanations of truth commission impact hold in none or only a few of the cases, whereas others 
have greater explanatory power.  
Drawing upon the existing literature, I identify ten explanations for truth commission 
impact: immediate political impact, delayed political impact through civil society mobilization, 
vetting, delegitimation, reaction to delegitimation, immediate reconciliation, impact on social 
norms, judicial impact, impunity through amnesty and impunity through distraction. Political 
impact refers to a commission’s capacity to make the key decision-makers acknowledge human 
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rights violations publicly and to influence policy in the areas of institutional reform and human 
rights policy through its findings and recommendations. Almost all truth commissions have 
produced political impact, albeit to different degrees. I distinguish between immediate and 
delayed impact to separate those cases in which the government demonstrates political will to 
implement truth commission recommendations immediately from other situations where the 
government is pressured to adopt policy. The distinction is important because delayed 
implementation often points to a high degree of civil society mobilization around the truth 
commission to pressure the government for reform. Although there is little systematic treatment 
of civil society mobilization in the literature, it is a crucial element that drives cross-national 
variations in policy adoption once the commission’s work comes to an end. 
Two causal explanations are discarded in light of evidence. Truth commissions do not 
forge immediate reconciliation through societal consensus, although most commissions name 
reconciliation among their chief goals. To the contrary, the post-commission period in each 
country is marked by disagreement and polarization over the commission’s findings and 
narratives. Similarly, truth commissions do not promote impunity by distracting or appeasing 
human rights groups and victims’ associations that advocate prosecution.  
Truth commissions’ contribution to human rights accountability or impunity is a 
controversial issue. I find that commissions have produced some judicial impact, understood as 
the use of findings for prosecution. Nonetheless, it often happens with a delay, highlighting the 
significance of an auspicious political and judicial context, as well as continued civil society 
activism, for human rights accountability. In other words, commissions do not trigger human 
rights trials in the absence of these factors. They may also promote impunity through amnesty 
procedures built into the commission in a small number of cases, and often in ways unanticipated 
by the existing scholarship. Despite the widespread tendency to associate truth commissions with 
amnesties, only two commissions (in South Africa and Liberia) have actually granted immunity 
from prosecution, and only to a handful of perpetrators. In other words, the failure of human 
rights accountability cannot be attributed to truth commissions.  
All truth commissions have tried to delegitimize at least some perpetrators, and faced 
angry reactions from those individuals and organizations representing, or in alliance with, violent 
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actors. However, it is unclear whether the delegitimation of perpetrators and the reaction to 
delegitimation have produced long-term political effects. Vetting (the policy of removing 
perpetrators from public office) as a result of a truth commission process has taken place only in 
El Salvador.  
Likewise, most truth commissions have tried to transform social norms by cultivating 
non-violence and respect for human rights (and other norms, depending on the specific context) 
among the political elite as well as the broader population, but admittedly, the results of these 
efforts remain inconclusive, in great part because normative change is extremely difficult to 
document. Nonetheless, I measure the impact on social norms with proxies, such as the publicity 
and educational incorporation of a commission’s results, and argue that the impact on social 
norms is likely to increase when domestic and international NGOs take the initiative to 
popularize a commission’s findings and message. Thus, civil society mobilization emerges again 
as a key intervening factor in explaining truth commission impact.  
The Literature on Truth Commissions 
Truth commissions are expected to contribute to human rights conduct and democratic 
strengthening.
1
 Ideally commissions acknowledge the victimhood of those affected by the human 
rights violations under the outgoing regime by providing a platform for truth-telling (Minow 
1998), and setting the stage for symbolic and material reparations (de Greiff et al. 2006; du Toit 
2000). They rewrite the nation’s history of political violence and human rights violations, 
focusing on the patterns, causes and consequences, in order to forge a shared historical memory 
and draw lessons from history (Ross 2003, 326; Andrews 2003). They make recommendations 
for institutional reform to create the legal, political and cultural framework conducive to peace 
and democratic strengthening (Minow 1998; Laplante 2007). Some commissions facilitate the 
removal of those public officials responsible for the earlier cycle of violence and violations 
(Magarrell 2003, 22). Furthermore, commissions may serve national reconciliation, a “healthy 
social catharsis” (Zalaquett 1992), as former enemies reach common understandings, the 
incentives for revenge diminish, and society is reunited through tolerance and forgiveness. For 
some, genuine reconciliation ought to be based on the full disclosure of past atrocities and the 
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provision of criminal justice: truth, justice and reparations complement one another (Amnesty 
International 2007). Others point to the looming threat of renewed violence or military coups 
during fragile transitions, and conceptualize the relationship between criminal justice and the 
other objectives of transitional justice, in particular democratic stability, as a trade-off. 
Accordingly, truth commissions’ success rests upon their ability to sidestep retributive justice, 
and promote restorative justice and social reconciliation – what one commentator names 
“compromise justice” (Grodsky 2009).2  
The numerous expectations from truth commissions have triggered scholarship that 
evaluates truth commissions’ achievements and shortcomings. International organizations and 
international NGOs have been publishing manuals to assess truth commissions’ role in 
promoting post-conflict peace and reconciliation using the best practices approach (OHCHR 
2006; Amnesty International 2007; Bloomfield, Barnes and Huyse 2003). Recently, scholars 
have turned to rigorous hypothesis-testing by employing statistical, survey, experimental and 
ethnographic methods, as well as mixed-method strategies. Those studies that evaluate truth 
commission impact tend to focus on the country’s human rights conduct (Brahm 2006; 
Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2009; Kim and Sikkink 2010; Olsen, Payne and Reiter 2010), democratic 
stability (Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003; Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010), social reconciliation (Gibson 
and Gouws 1999; Gibson 2006), and the rule of law (Gibson 2004). Although case studies of one 
or several truth commissions had initially dominated the field,
3
 recent studies increasingly use 
large-n regression analysis.
4
  
A striking characteristic of the existing literature is the coexistence of competing, if not 
outright contradictory, theories about truth commission impact (Thoms, Ron and Paris 2010). 
For example, Olsen, Payne and Reiter find that truth commissions, when used alone, “have a 
significant, negative effect” on democracy and human rights, but yield positive outcomes when 
combined with trials and amnesties (Olsen, Payne and Reiter 2010, 153-4). Kim and Sikkink 
(2010), on the other hand, argue that truth commissions have a positive independent effect on 
human rights conduct, which increases in magnitude if accompanied by prosecutions. Others find 
truth commissions to have weak negative impact (Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010), or no observable 
impact at all
5
 on democracy and human rights. 
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What explains the divergent results between studies that explore the same causal 
relationship? Qualitative and quantitative research strategies are known to produce 
systematically different results in human rights research (Hafner-Burton and Ron 2009). 
Moreover, even studies using the same data collection and analysis method (for example, large-n 
regression analysis) arrive at divergent results due to differences in their conceptualization of key 
variables, codification and collection of data, and model specification. Scholarly disagreement on 
the definition of a truth commission or amnesty law has implications for coding data and testing 
theories. Transitional justice databases often codify the same procedure under different 
categories, which in part explains divergent outcomes. For example, the Transitional Justice Data 
Base Project sets the number of truth commissions established between 1970 and 2007 at sixty, 
while the figure ranges between 30 and 40 in all other studies. Once the concepts are defined and 
data codified, the specification of relevant variables can generate differences, too. For example, 
two recent studies of human rights accountability disagree over the evidence for the “justice 
cascade” (i.e., unprecedented human rights accountability) in the 1990s and 2000s: while Kim 
and Sikkink (2010) get statistically significant results supporting the theory, Olsen, Payne and 
Reiter (2010) argue that the incorporation of amnesty laws into the statistical model eliminates 
the overwhelming support for the justice cascade.  
Another set of complications arises from the intrinsic difficulty of measuring truth 
commission impact (Brahm 2007). Critics rightly warn against confounding other causal 
processes with the independent impact of truth commissions.
6
 It makes intuitive sense to expect 
improvements in human rights conduct and democratic governance during and after the truth 
commission process in great part because truth commissions are likely to be established during 
democratic transitions, and when the human rights situation has already improved, at least to the 
extent that transitional justice becomes a viable possibility. The reverse case, i.e., when the truth 
commission process is followed by increasing levels of violence and instability, does not offer 
much analytical leverage, either: countries that have undergone civil wars are more likely to 
suffer from violent conflict in the future, but truth commissions’ role in provoking such conflict 
is unclear. Therefore, the variety of factors that might lead to democratic strengthening and non-
violence (which in turn makes the creation of a truth commission possible), or renewed conflict, 
should not be conflated with the independent effect of truth commissions. 
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Many scholars therefore prefer regression analysis to make causal inferences on the 
independent effect of truth commissions on democracy and human rights. Insufficient attention 
to causal processes, however, might aggravate the problems of endogeneity and multicollinearity 
in statistical analysis. Aware of this difficulty, most studies propose one or several causal 
mechanisms to link the truth commission process to the outcomes of interest, but it is often 
unclear how they build their hypotheses or which observable implications confirm them. For 
example, Olsen, Payne and Reiter attribute the potential positive effects of truth commissions to 
their capacity to provide a forum for dialogue, “a fundamental building block for peace and 
democratic trust” (Olsen, Payne and Reiter 2010, 155). However, they conclude that the 
combination of trials and amnesties without truth commissions contribute to democracy and 
human rights, as well as the combination of trials, amnesties and truth commissions. In what 
ways, then, are truth commissions relevant? Moreover, the claim that truth commissions foster 
dialogue between victims, perpetrators and bystanders does not apply to the majority of the cases 
where perpetrators do not testify before the commission, and often try to close the space for 
dialogue. Wiebelhaus-Brahm provides several explanations for how truth commissions might 
influence political behavior, but his statistical analysis, which finds a negative correlation with 
human rights conduct and no significant relation with democratic politics, tends to contradict 
many of the possible causal mechanisms described elsewhere in the book (Wiebelhaus-Brahm 
2010, 137). 
Kim and Sikkink (2010) provide a plausible causal explanation for their findings: 
commissions’ findings and advocacy of the human rights norm build pressure on perpetrators, 
making prosecutions more likely. The observable implication of their theory is that prosecutors 
would initiate lawsuits following the commission process, building their case on commission 
findings. However, their dataset, Human Rights Trials in the World, 1979–2006, shows that few 
truth commissions have created the impulse for prosecution. Furthermore, even if one assumes 
that truth commissions do produce normative transformations, their study does not produce 
evidence that some politicians, civil society actors, attorneys and judges have changed behavior 
as a result of the truth commission process. 
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Failing to account for the heterogeneity of truth commission experiences compounds 
these problems. Several consolidated democracies, like Brazil, and ongoing authoritarian 
regimes, like Morocco, established truth commissions in the 2000s. The political stakes, self-
declared goals, and methodologies were radically different from those characterizing transitional 
truth commissions. Ensuring democratic stability or forging reconciliation between victims and 
perpetrators, for example, were not outstanding goals for non-transitional commissions. In 
countries like Chile and South Korea, follow-up truth commissions investigated violations not 
covered by an earlier commission. Therefore, lumping all truth commissions in one database 
obscures the distinct character of causal processes in transitional and non-transitional settings. 
Many of the shortcomings of the literature can be addressed if the research strategy pays 
close attention to causal processes rather than correlations between a truth commission and 
outcomes of interest, such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law. I explain cross-
national variation in truth commission impact by employing the comparative method, but instead 
of lumping all truth commissions in a large-n dataset, I separate a total of 15 transitional 
commissions from non-transitional ones to explain the dynamics specific to the former group. 
Instead of assessing impact on human rights conduct or democracy, I focus on the specific 
mechanisms through which commissions are likely to produce such impact.  
Causal Explanations of Truth Commission Impact 
Several causal mechanisms have been proposed to evaluate commissions’ capacity to 
produce changes in policy, judicial practices and social norms. Most accounts pay attention only 
to some parts of the causal chain that links the initial conditions to the outcomes of interest. I 
draw upon the literature on truth commissions, from enthusiasts as well as skeptics, to outline 
these mechanisms in full here, but if the existing explanations have missing causal links, I 
identify those missing parts. Table 1 (next page) presents these causal mechanisms, along with 
their observable implications and supporting empirical evidence (if any). 
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Table 1: Hypotheses of Truth Commission Impact 
Name of Causal 
Mechanism 
Causal Process Observable 
Implications 
Empirical evidence 
Immediate Political 
Impact 
Findings and recommendations 
► Official publication, 
acknowledgment and 
implementation  
Political will to implement 
commission recommendations 
Immediate publication, 
acknowledgment and 
implementation 
Most commissions produce 
immediate political impact 
Variation across commissions 
Delayed Political Impact Civil society mobilization 
around the commission ► 
Pressure on government ► 
Delayed official implementation 
Civil society mobilization 
Delayed implementation under 
pressure 
Some commissions produce 
delayed political impact 
through civil society 
mobilization 
Variation across commissions 
Vetting  Vetting recommended ► 
Official implementation 
Recommendation of vetting 
Political will to implement 
El Salvador (1993) only 
Delegitimation Commission delegitimizes 
perpetrators ► Civil society 
mobilization around the 
commission ► Pressure on 
government ► Exclusion or 
self-exclusion of perpetrators 
Civil society mobilization for 
formal or informal vetting 
All commissions try to 
delegitimize 
Variation across commissions 
Difficult to measure 
Reaction to 
delegitimation 
Delegitimation & 
recommendation for vetting ► 
Reaction by perpetrators and 
their allies ► Delegitimation 
defeated  
Failure to mobilize civil society  
Political salience of presumed 
perpetrators 
Most commissions face 
reaction 
Variation across commissions 
Difficult to measure 
Immediate 
Reconciliation 
Commission as a democratic & 
participatory platform ► 
Consensus and reconciliation 
between victims, perpetrators 
and bystanders 
Consensus and reconciliation 
immediately after truth 
commission  
No evidence for immediate 
reconciliation 
Counter-evidence: Lack of 
consensus immediately after 
truth commission 
Impact on Social Norms Publicity and incorporation into 
educational curriculum ► 
Widespread acceptance of 
commission norms ► Norm 
change 
Public awareness of truth 
commission’s message 
Incorporation into educational 
curricula 
Some commissions may have 
produced normative change  
Variation across commissions 
Difficult to measure 
Judicial Impact Findings ► Judges and 
prosecutors use in proceedings, 
immediately or delayed 
Use of truth commission report 
in proceedings 
Delayed and very limited use 
of some commissions’ 
findings in domestic and 
foreign courts 
Impunity through 
Amnesty 
Commissions accompany 
amnesty laws or promote 
amnesty ► Impunity for 
perpetrators 
Amnesty built into, or 
legislated along with, truth 
commission 
Impunity resulting from truth 
commission  
Conditional amnesty built into 
commission (South Africa, 
Liberia); most perpetrators not 
covered 
Counter-evidence: amnesty 
law to offset truth commission 
impact (Nepal and El 
Salvador) 
Impunity through 
Distraction 
Commissions dampen the 
demand for retribution ► 
Impunity for perpetrators 
Civil society demobilization No evidence of civil society 
demobilization 
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1. Immediate political impact 
The most straightforward causal impact is when the findings and recommendations of a 
truth commission’s final report are incorporated into policy. If a government acknowledges the 
commission’s final report, legislates reparations for victims, and establishes watchdog 
institutions for human rights protection, then these reforms are likely to lead to progress in 
democratic governance and human rights conduct. Immediate political impact crucially depends 
on political decision-makers’ ability and willingness to implement commissions’ 
recommendations. Only in El Salvador and Sierra Leone did the commission mandate state that 
the recommendations would be binding on all parties, and even then politicians enjoyed a high 
degree of discretion on which reform proposals to adopt. 
The degree to which a truth commission’s recommendations are implemented into policy 
without delay (in other words, within one year of the commission’s final report) is an appropriate 
measure of immediate political impact. Delayed implementation points to other causal processes, 
such as civil society pressure overcoming government inattentiveness. Immediate 
implementation, to the contrary, is a key measure of political will. Given that truth commissions 
make context-specific recommendations, and given that the quality of policy implementation can 
be quite varied, comparative measures are bound to be imperfect.
7
 Nevertheless, one observes 
near-universal demand for certain policies and political gestures, which I employ as measures of 
immediate political impact: (1) public endorsement of the commission’s work by government 
leadership; (2) government publication of the commission’s final report; (3) implementation of a 
reparations program (this measure is applicable in 12 cases where the truth commission 
recommended reparations); and (4) the creation of follow-up institutions to carry out the 
recommended reforms and monitor progress.  
It is important to note that a government might implement human rights policies whether 
or not it abides by the truth commission’s recommendations. Immediate political impact captures 
only the truth commission-induced political change, which is often confounded with the 
country’s overall human rights improvement, leading to the under- or overstatement of truth 
commission impact. The measures described above refer to political change relative to the 
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commission’s recommendations for reform. I take into account variations in discursive and 
policy change relative to the expectations of each country’s truth commission in conducting 
cross-national comparisons, rather than variation in overall political reform. Thus I isolate the 
independent effect of truth commissions from the broader reform processes during democratic 
transition.  
Such generic and context-blind measures, even if they allow for cross-national 
comparison, might be highly imperfect and misleading if not accompanied by case studies that 
capture the extent to which the political decision-makers address country-specific problems, as 
diagnosed by the national truth commission. I employ these general measures for the comparison 
of 15 truth commissions, but the comparative study of truth commissions in Chile and Peru, 
based on semi-structured interviews and research on press archives, provides a context-sensitive 
account of the match between truth commission recommendations and policy implementation.  
2. Delayed political impact 
Several accounts argue that a truth commission might improve a country’s human rights 
record by drawing attention to past violations (Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010, 9; Amnesty 
International 2007). Domestic and international actors, most notably human rights organizations 
and victims’ associations, build sufficient pressure on politicians and state functionaries to 
reform human rights policy and behave in conformity with a truth commission’s 
recommendations. What distinguishes indirect from immediate political impact is that decision-
makers adopt truth commission recommendations and related human rights initiatives only as a 
result of civil society pressure. Thus, implementation is typically delayed, rather than immediate.  
Delayed political impact is likely to result from what I label civil society mobilization 
around the truth commission. Civil society mobilization refers to a truth commission’s ability to 
motivate human rights activism, especially in the post-commission period. I use three measures 
to account for civil society mobilization: (1) non-governmental initiatives to publish and/or 
disseminate the commission’s final report if the government fails to do so; (2) activism on the 
part of local and national NGOs to monitor the progress on the implementation of 
recommendations; and (3) the emergence of new local and national civil society organizations, 
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that is to say, human rights NGOs and victims’ associations, as a result of the commission 
process.  
Generally, domestic human rights groups make alliances with international organizations 
and transnational networks to hold governments accountable to the human rights norm (Beitz 
2003). Whether domestic human rights activism originates from, or merely follows, the 
transnational actors, is a matter of controversy. Some see transitional advocacy networks’ 
capacity to pressure governments by naming and shaming them in the international arena as 
crucial (Keck and Sikkink 1998), whereas others point to the predominantly domestic nature of 
legitimacy and norm change (Moravcsik 1997; Anaya 2009). In the case of truth commission 
recommendations, what I observe is that even when international actors initiate the commission 
process, the success of the reform process ultimately depends on pressure built by domestic 
human rights groups.  
Civil society mobilization only measures the capacity of the commission to motivate civil 
society actors. Human rights activism may exist independently of, and conceivably in opposition 
to, a truth commission. This measure does not capture the overall quality of civic relations (i.e., 
social capital); it instead focuses on those civic groups most likely to pursue the truth 
commission’s agenda and maximize its impact, since the primary concern is to explain the 
precise mechanisms through which truth commissions produce impact. Finally, the model of 
civil society advocacy presented here does not make a priori assumptions about state-civil 
society relations – it does not claim right away that they are antagonistic or mutually reinforcing. 
It is plausible to expect that political impact and civil society mobilization are both high, both 
low, or in an inverse relationship in any given country. 
3. Vetting 
Truth commissions might recommend the removal of presumed perpetrators and their 
political supporters from public office. Also known as lustration, this causal mechanism is 
relatively easy to measure: a commission may or may not make an explicit recommendation for 
vetting, and if it does, the government may or may not implement it. It is also plausible that a 
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government removes individuals from public office in the absence of commission 
recommendation, which is unrelated to the causal mechanism presented here.  
4. Delegitimation 
Another causal explanation states that truth commissions improve democratic governance 
and human rights conduct by exposing, shaming or delegitimizing anti-democratic and violent 
actors, even when they do not make a plea for official vetting (Freeman and Hayner 2003, 126-7; 
Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010, 12; Landsman 1996, 89). All commissions have pointed to those 
individual and institutional actors responsible for human rights violations, albeit with varying 
levels of specificity: a number of commissions have named individual perpetrators, while others 
have described in detail the systematic and institutional nature of human rights violations under 
the outgoing regime. Unlike vetting, which relies on explicit recommendation and direct political 
implementation, this causal mechanism relies on civil society mobilization to further 
delegitimize violent actors.  
5. Reaction to delegitimation 
Some scholars have argued that the delegitimation effect might work against democratic 
strengthening and social peace. Those individuals and institutions that have the most to fear from 
human rights accountability often seek to steer the course of national debates away from truth 
and memory.
8
 Alleged perpetrators and their allies, acting in individual and organizational 
capacity, have tended to not participate in truth commission processes, tried to obstruct truth-
finding efforts, and been the quickest to condemn commission findings. The denial of the truth 
commission findings often accompanies denigration against the commissioners. So much so that, 
commissioners and collaborating social activists in many countries have suffered various threats 
and attacks against their lives and wellbeing during and after the truth commission process.
9
  
If they succeed in swaying key decision-makers and the broader public, they might see 
their position strengthened in the context of a fragile democracy. Furthermore, some of those 
actors might engage in extra-legal activities to defend their power, further undermining 
democratic stability and the rule of law (Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010, 13). The failure of a truth 
commission to mobilize civil society is likely to aggravate the failure of delegitimation. In other 
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words, explanations based on the delegitimizing effect of truth commissions need to 
conceptualize the post-commission political developments as a dynamic and open-ended process 
that involves a multiplicity of political and social actors contesting and reconstructing political 
legitimacy in the short- and long-run. 
Delegitimation and reaction to delegitimation pose serious challenges to research on truth 
commissions. First, the quantitative criteria for successful delegitimation are unclear. How many 
of those individuals who deserve public opprobrium actually face unofficial sanction? Is there a 
cut-off number to evaluate success and failure? In many cases one sees the delegitimation, even 
prosecution, of some violent actors, whereas other individuals who may have faced similar 
treatment seem to enjoy political clout. The second challenge, related to the first, is that 
delegitimation is a long-term and society-wide process, which can only be measured via 
periodical and consistent surveys on representative samples. Added to the difficulty is that many 
individuals lose the public’s favor independently of the naming and shaming by truth 
commissions, so the independent effect of truth commissions might be conflated with other 
processes of delegitimation.  
6. Reconciliation through consensus 
The capacity to reduce social conflict through truth commissions has captured the 
imagination of transitional justice scholars. According to this line of explanation, the potential 
for renewed conflict decreases because the inclusion of victims and victims’ relatives in the 
human rights investigation reduces their incentives for revenge (Govier 2002), the creation of a 
participatory space through truth commissions results in the affirmation of democratic values; 
victims, perpetrators and bystanders engage in dialogue (Olsen, Payne and Reiter 2010, 155); 
perpetrators and victims learn to live under “contentious coexistence” (Payne 2008), and the 
rewriting of official history allows society to reach consensus about human rights violations and 
the meaning of the national past.
10
 The idea of reconciliation is so engrained as an expectation 
that many commissions are called truth and reconciliation commissions.  
One observable implication of such immediate reconciliation would be when the 
individuals representing different viewpoints with respect to past violence converge on the 
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accuracy and significance of the truth commission’s work. Military and insurgency leaders, 
politicians across the political spectrum, and high-court judges acknowledge the facts of human 
rights violations, and perhaps even provide mea culpa statements. However, as I show in the next 
section, reconciliation through consensus is not supported by evidence. 
7. Impact on social norms 
It is possible that truth commissions’ efforts at ruling out violence and promoting 
democratic participation might produce long-term effects by cultivating a civic culture based on 
non-violence and human rights (Gairdner 1999; Oettler 2006). Truth commissions do not 
advocate the exact same set of norms. For example, the South African TRC stands out with its 
emphasis on forgiveness, while the Guatemalan commission is known for its defense of 
socioeconomic and cultural equality. Nonetheless, the defense of non-violent political conduct 
and respect for human rights is present across commissions. Thus, impact on social norms 
captures a commission’s self-understanding of the values that it promotes. 
It is notoriously difficult to measure long-term normative changes, let alone determine if 
they were caused by truth commissions’ transformative potential. Nonetheless, assuming that 
broad-based exposure to a truth commission’s ideas increases social groups’ likelihood of 
internalizing non-violence and respect for human rights, two of the observable implications, 
which I use as proxies for the impact on social norms hypothesis, can be measured: (1) 
widespread access to, and readership of, the truth commission’s final products (the report as well 
as audiovisual documentation), measured by governmental and nongovernmental efforts to 
disseminate the commission’s work; and (2) the incorporation of the commission’s findings and 
recommendations in school curricula.
11
 
8. Judicial impact 
Do truth commissions contribute to human rights accountability? Truth commissions are 
not allowed to deliver sentences, but their findings may be used during criminal proceedings, 
either as evidence or contextual information (Abrams and Hayner 2002; Amnesty International 
2007). Judicial impact depends on the powers granted by the truth commission mandate, judges’ 
and prosecutors’ willingness to incorporate commission findings, and the existence of laws and 
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conditional amnesty procedures that precede or operate simultaneously with the commission. 
Commissions differ with respect to their search and subpoena powers and the power to name 
perpetrators. Setting mandate limits on commissions’ judicial attributes is justified on the 
grounds of fair trial guarantees (Freeman 2006). Another difficulty is that prosecutors might be 
unwilling to use findings to initiate lawsuits against alleged perpetrators, claiming that 
commission procedures fail to satisfy the evidentiary standards of the courtroom. As I show in 
the next section, judicial impact happens with delay, reflecting civil society mobilization to 
pressure judges and prosecutors into a more activist stance with respect to human rights trials. 
9. Impunity through amnesty 
Skeptics have long noted the possibility that truth commissions, far from contributing to 
justice, in fact serve to perpetuate impunity, as they provide an imperfect substitute for human 
rights trials. It is generally assumed that the truth commission is a moderate transitional justice 
tool to meet the victims’ demands in the context of a negotiated political transition (Harris and 
Reilly 1998; Hayner 1998). Jon Elster, for example, notes that a new democratic regime may 
have to “choose between justice and truth” (Elster 2004, 116–7). Mark J. Osiel (2000) takes the 
opposition between truth commissions and prosecution to an extreme when he claims that most 
commissions’ inability to take testimonies from perpetrators not only undermines justice, but 
defeats the justification for the presence of the truth commission: to establish the historical truth, 
which involves the full disclosure of violations and names of perpetrators. Especially the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission has raised serious concerns about the extent to 
which truth commissions serve to sidestep accountability, as a specialized Amnesty Committee 
granted amnesty to those perpetrators who fully confessed to their crimes, and the truth 
commission itself promoted a highly Christianized notion of forgiveness.  
Impunity through amnesty holds if truth commissions provide amnesties for perpetrators 
through amnesty laws built into the truth commission or legislated as a result of the 
commission’s work. Especially the South African TRC’s amnesty procedures have led to the 
misperception that truth commissions generally give away amnesties to perpetrators by invoking 
the language of forgiveness and reconciliation,
12
 but as I describe in the next section, few 
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commissions have offered amnesties, and even built-in amnesty procedures do not guarantee an 
escape from justice for most perpetrators.  
10. Impunity through distraction 
Other skeptics argue that the spectacle of a truth commission creates a distraction from 
prosecution. More specifically, the recognition of victims and the provision of material and 
symbolic reparations through truth commissions may assuage the public demand for truth and 
some kind of justice.
13
 Furthermore, the decision to establish a truth commission itself is a sad 
admission of the country’s inability to prosecute, which undermines the rule of law at the outset 
of a democratic transition.
14
 The observable implication of this hypothesis is that the public 
demand for prosecutions would fall, and civil society groups advocating retributive justice would 
get demobilized during and after the truth commission process.  
Empirical Evidence for Causal Explanations 
Immediate political impact is the chief mechanism through which commissions influence 
policy, but the implementation is always selective. Table 2 (next pages) shows that all 
transitional truth commissions except the one in Nepal have produced some immediate political 
impact. Of the 15 transitional truth commissions, ten published the final report within one year of 
the commission’s termination. Presidents, backed by the governments they represented, endorsed 
the commission’s work upon receiving the final report in five countries. In South Africa, 
President Mandela endorsed the final report despite opposition from the governing ANC. 
Acknowledgment did not take place in eight countries, and in Sierra Leone, it happened 
only after a new president assumed office. Seven countries established follow-up institutions to 
monitor the post-commission reform process, whereas eight did not. The least favored policy by 
the governments was reparation: 12 truth commissions demanded compensation for victims, and 
only Chile and Sri Lanka initiated a program within one year of the commission’s publication, 
and six more implemented reparations with a delay ranging from two years (Peru) to over two 
decades (Argentina).  
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Table 2: Truth Commission Impact in 15 Transitional Commissions* 
 Reparations 
Recommended 
/Immediately 
Implemented 
(Yes/Yes, 
Yes/No, No/No) 
Immediate 
Publication 
of Final 
Report 
(Yes, No) 
Official 
Endorsement 
(Yes, No) 
Immediate 
Creation of 
Follow-up 
Institutions 
Recommended 
Reparations 
Implemented as 
a Result of Civil 
Society 
Mobilization 
Publication 
of Final 
Report as a 
Result of 
Civil Society 
Mobilization 
Argentina 
(1983) 
Yes/ No Yes Yes No No 
(reparations: 
2004) 
Immediate 
policy 
Uganda 
(1986) 
No/No No  No Ugandan 
Human Rights 
Commission 
No reparations No 
publication 
Nepal 
(1990) 
No/No No No None No reparations Yes 
(1994) 
Chile 
(1990) 
Yes/Yes 
(1992) 
Yes Yes National 
Corporation for 
Reparation and 
Reconciliation 
Immediate 
policy (1992) 
Immediate 
policy 
Chad 
(1991) 
No/No Yes No None No reparations  Immediate 
policy 
El Salvador 
(1992) 
Yes/No Yes No None No reparations Immediate 
policy 
Sri Lanka 
(1994) 
Yes/Yes No No Presidential 
Commission on 
Ethnic Violence 
Yes 
(reparations: 
1998) 
Yes 
(2001) 
Haiti 
(1995) 
Yes/No No No Office of the 
Public 
Prosecutor 
No reparations Yes 
(1998) 
South Africa 
(1995) 
Yes/No Yes Yes 
(government 
divided) 
None Yes 
(reparations: 
2003) 
Immediate 
policy 
Guatemala 
(1997) 
Yes/No Yes Yes None Yes 
(reparations: 
2005) 
Immediate 
policy 
Nigeria 
(1999) 
Yes/No No Yes None No reparations Yes 
(2005; 
unofficial) 
Peru 
(2001) 
Yes/No  Yes Yes None Yes 
(reparations 
forthcoming) 
Immediate 
policy 
East Timor 
(2002) 
Yes/No Yes No Technical 
Secretariat 
Yes 
(reparations: 
2010) 
Immediate 
policy 
Sierra 
Leone 
(2002) 
Yes/No Yes No 
(delayed 
endorsement) 
National 
Commission for 
Social Action 
Yes 
(reparations: 
2008) 
Immediate 
policy 
Liberia 
(2006) 
Yes/No Yes No Independent 
National 
Commission on 
Human Rights 
Ongoing civil 
society 
campaign 
Immediate 
policy 
* ‘Yes’ / positive outcomes are indicated in red. 
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Table 2 (continued): Truth Commission Impact in 15 Transitional Commissions* 
 New human rights 
NGOs established to 
monitor post-
commission policy  
Non-governmental 
efforts to 
disseminate truth 
commission report 
Vetting 
Recommended/ 
Implemented  
Judicial Impact Amnesty law 
legislated during 
or immediately 
after the truth 
commission 
Argentina 
(1983) 
No No No/No Domestic 
courts; 
immediate and 
delayed 
No 
Uganda 
(1986) 
No No No/No None No 
Nepal 
(1990) 
No No No/No None Yes 
(1991; de facto) 
Chile 
(1990) 
No No No/No Domestic and 
foreign courts; 
delayed 
No 
Chad 
(1991) 
No 
 
No Yes/No Foreign courts; 
delayed 
No 
El Salvador 
(1992) 
No No Yes/Yes 
(1993; partial) 
Foreign courts; 
delayed 
Yes 
(1993; blanket) 
Sri Lanka 
(1994) 
No No No/No Domestic 
courts; 
immediate and 
delayed 
No 
Haiti 
(1995) 
No No No/No None No 
South Africa 
(1995) 
Institute for Justice 
and Reconciliation 
(2000) 
Yes No/No None Yes 
(built-in; partial) 
Guatemala 
(1997) 
No Yes No/No Domestic and 
foreign courts; 
delayed 
No 
Nigeria 
(1999) 
No Yes No /Yes (1999) Domestic 
courts; 
immediate 
No 
Peru 
(2001) 
Movimiento 
Ciudadano Para Que 
No Se Repita (2003) 
Yes No/No Domestic 
courts; 
immediate and 
delayed 
No 
East Timor 
(2002) 
No Yes Yes/No None No 
Sierra Leone 
(2002) 
Transitional justice 
branch of the 
Campaign for Good 
Governance  
Yes No/No None No  
Liberia 
(2006) 
Post TRC Transitional 
Justice Initiative 
under the Transitional 
Justice Working 
Group  
Yes Yes/No None Yes 
(built-in; partial) 
* ‘Yes’ / positive outcomes are indicated in red. 
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Several, but not all, truth commissions provided a platform for domestic human rights 
groups to make demands on the government and evaluate policy progress. There is evidence of 
civil society mobilization around the truth commission in ten countries, although with varying 
degrees. Human rights activism led to the delayed publication of the final report or the adoption 
of reparations programs in various countries. In South Africa, Guatemala, Peru, East Timor and 
Sierra Leone, reluctant governments found themselves pressured into legislating reparations 
programs, although the speed and efficiency with which the reparations were actually disbursed 
generated discontent in most cases. In Nepal, Sri Lanka and Haiti, it took domestic and/or 
international human rights organizations several years of pressuring to get the government to 
publish the commission’s final report, and in Nigeria, private initiative undertook the 
publication. Furthermore, new civil society organizations were formed in South Africa, Peru, 
Sierra Leone and Liberia to monitor the progress of reforms in the wake of the truth commission.  
Not all cases of civil society mobilization point to truth commission impact: in Chad, 
human rights groups successfully campaigned for reparations even though the truth commission 
did not recommend the policy, and in Argentina, there is no evidence to show that the campaign 
for reparations, succeeding 20 years after the publication of the final report, was influenced by 
the truth commission in any way.  
Recommending vetting/lustration does not appear to be a significant impact mechanism 
for truth commissions. Four of the 15 transitional truth commissions have demanded the removal 
of presumed perpetrators from office; the government has met this demand partially in El 
Salvador, whereas in Chad, East Timor and Liberia, the call for vetting was disregarded. In one 
of the countries where it was used (Nigeria), the truth commission had not recommended the 
measure.  
While official lustration is uncommon, truth commissions may have contributed to the 
elimination of presumed perpetrators from public life by delegitimizing their political status in 
the eyes of citizens. Eight of the transitional commissions have published the names of 
individual perpetrators, and at least in one other case (Argentina), the list of perpetrators was 
“leaked” by the press. Beyond individuals, truth commissions have also criticized organizational 
actors, such as the military, police, armed opposition, political parties, and judicial institutions, 
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for committing or condoning human rights violations, and contributing to a political context in 
which violations would happen. They have often refuted self-justificatory discourses of violent 
actors (Zalaquett 1990, 629). The angry responses to the commissions’ findings on the part of 
military institutions almost everywhere, high courts (e.g., Chile) and political parties (e.g., South 
Africa’s major parties, including the African National Congress) shows that truth commissions 
are capable of delegitimizing institutional actors, and consequently, the individuals representing 
these institutions.  
Much less clear, however, is whether delegitimation translates into change of personnel 
within institutions or a nationwide attitude change towards human rights. The military and high 
courts in Chile did not undergo significant change in the first five years following the publication 
of the truth commission report. Augusto Pinochet was the retired commander-in-chief, with full 
honors, and lifelong senator, when he was arrested in London in October 1998. In Guatemala, 
the political repercussions of human rights awareness were deeply felt when various court 
decisions ruled (and overruled) former dictator and presumed human rights violator Efraín Ríos 
Montt’s bid for presidency in 2004, a process that brought his opponents and supporters in bitter 
conflict. Montt participated in the presidential election, lost, and ran a successful campaign for a 
seat in Congress in 2007. In Peru, former president Alberto Fujimori was sentenced for human 
rights violations in 2009, but his political downfall had begun before the truth commission, and 
in fact, the commission became possible only after Fujimori’s corrupt civilian-authoritarian 
regime collapsed in 2000. Following collapsed transitions (e.g., Argentina, Uganda, Chad, Haiti, 
Peru, among others) commissions have further discredited former dictators by publicizing the 
abuses and corruption under their regime, but it is impossible to disentangle truth commissions’ 
role in discrediting deposed and widely hated dictators. In conclusion, there is suggestive 
evidence for the delegitimation of perpetrators and their allies, as well as their reaction to 
delegitimation, but the specific mechanisms that affect their stature are too complex to attribute 
to the independent effect of truth commissions.  
The idea that truth commissions produce consensus and reconciliation between victims, 
perpetrators and bystanders draws no empirical support. This causal explanation misses the 
potential for increased social and political conflict (although not necessarily violence) resulting 
                                                   Truth Commission Impact       25 
 
from the reactions of individual and organizational actors accused of conducting and/or abetting 
human rights violations, as well as victims’ own frustrations with the truth-telling process 
(Hamber and Wilson 2002). Far from acknowledging violations and seeking reconciliation, 
presumed perpetrators and their political allies resort to rejecting the findings and conclusions of 
the commission, discrediting the moral authority of the commissioners and victims, and in 
extreme cases, threaten the political system with instability. In Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala 
and Peru, military leaders were quick to reject the truth commission’s work in angry words. The 
Supreme Court of Chile went so far to declare that the commission’s final report put the 
country’s institutional stability in danger. In South Africa and Peru, political parties voiced 
serious disagreements with the truth commission, and certainly did not make a gesture toward 
apology, forgiveness or reconciliation. If anyone, it has been the leadership of the incoming 
government that has extended a gesture of acknowledgment and apology toward victims, and not 
those individuals and institutions responsible for past violence. 
In conclusion, the release of a commission’s final report invariably leads to disagreement 
and a tense political environment, at least in the short-run (Dwyer 2006). The parties to violent 
conflict acknowledged, and apologized for, violations in Argentina, Chile, East Timor, but only 
years after the publication of the commission’s final report.15 The commission may have played 
an important role by providing the factual basis upon which to build a politics of recognition and 
forgiveness, but this role should be evaluated in the context of long-term normative and political 
transformations, rather than immediate reconciliation. Consensus-based models of truth 
commission impact need to be abandoned in favor of explanations that acknowledge the conflict 
potential of coming to terms with a violent and divisive past. Social reconciliation is a complex 
and multivalent process that defies quick closure (Verdeja 2004).  
It should be also noted, however, that there is no evidence that any truth commission has 
caused resumption of violence. The termination of the commission’s work coincided with large-
scale violence in Sri Lanka, but no observer has attributed to the commission process a causal 
role.  
A satisfactory cross-national analysis of truth commissions’ impact on social norms 
would require nothing less than conducting standardized surveys on the change of social and 
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political values as a result of truth commissions among representative samples in various 
countries. The best available data come from case studies, including my fieldwork in Chile and 
Peru, and the only available proxies for impact on social norms, albeit imperfect, are the data on 
the dissemination of truth commission’s final work. Evidence shows that some truth 
commissions have devised ways to increase public awareness of their findings and 
recommendations, such as publishing the final report as a marketable book or in a newspaper, 
producing an accessible version of the final report for adults and/or children (Peru and Sierra 
Leone), organizing outreach activities, etc. Governments have been invariably unsupportive of 
truth commissions’ dissemination efforts other than publishing the final report. Even the official 
publication was not available to most citizens in Uganda, Sri Lanka, Haiti, and Nigeria. 
Domestic and international civil society organizations have spearheaded efforts to incorporate 
the commission’s findings and lessons into educational curricula, but there are reports of 
national-level incorporation in Guatemala only (Oglesby 2007). Several of my interviewees in 
Peru stated that educational incorporation was one of the major goals of local civil society 
groups in Ayacucho and Huancavelica, in the face of lack of political will at the local and 
national levels. Finally, incorporation might be highly problematic for teachers, who find 
themselves in a position to adjudicate historical controversies with the aid of the truth 
commission, at times to the dismay of school authorities and parents. In conclusion, truth 
commissions’ contribution to society-wide normative change is inconclusive, but civil society 
mobilization to popularize the commission’s work is likely to account for the possibility of 
enacting such change.  
Several commissions have generated judicial impact, but the magnitude of the impact 
remains small. In Argentina, human rights trials began immediately after the truth commission, 
although the commission’s findings or recommendations may not have influenced the decision 
directly. The commissions in Chile, Chad, El Salvador, Guatemala and Peru saw their findings 
incorporated into domestic or foreign lawsuits as contextual information. Except for Peru, where 
the commission handed in relevant information to the Attorney General’s Office immediately, 
even the preliminary investigation for prosecutions took place several years after the publication 
of the final report. In none of the cases did judicial impact extend beyond one or two high-profile 
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cases, such as the arrest of Pinochet, the indictment of Habré, and the conviction of Fujimori. 
Truth commission findings may provide the factual basis upon which to build human rights 
accountability, but they have hardly been utilized in courts.  
Do truth commissions promote amnesty, then? There is a tendency to exaggerate the 
prevalence of amnesty laws accompanying truth commissions as a result of the attention given to 
the South African TRC’s amnesty procedures (Pensky 2008). South Africa and Liberia are the 
only countries where an amnesty-for-truth option was built into the commission, but it would be 
unfair to fault the amnesty procedure for the obstruction of justice: the South African TRC 
rejected about 88% of the 7112 amnesty applications as of 2000, and many perpetrators did not 
testify at all.
16
 Thus, the majority of perpetrators are available for prosecution. The results in 
Liberia are yet to be seen. Peace accords in Guatemala and Sierra Leone initially had amnesty 
provisions, but pressure from the international community and domestic NGOs forced the 
exclusion of serious charges, such as genocide and crimes against humanity, from the amnesty 
laws. In other words, the failure to prosecute results less from amnesty laws accompanying truth 
commissions than other factors, such as the unwillingness of the judiciary or political pressures.  
In Chile and Sri Lanka, amnesty laws preceded the truth commission by over a decade. 
Chile’s amnesty law dates back to 1978, and Sri Lanka’s to 1982 – long before the respective 
truth commissions of 1990 and 1994. El Salvador and Nepal are the only countries where a truth 
commission resulted in amnesty, but precisely as counter-evidence for the impunity through 
amnesty hypothesis: an amnesty law was passed hastily in each country as the release of the final 
report generated the fear of prosecution among the political and military elite (Popkin and Roht-
Arriaza 1995). The post-commission amnesties in Argentina served to stop criminal 
accountability, but they had nothing to do with the truth commission’s work: 1986 Full Stop Law 
halted the prosecution of most perpetrators, and Carlos Menem’s 1989 presidential pardon of 
military officers accused of violations further undermined retributive justice.  
There is no empirical evidence to show that the actors who actively seek prosecution get 
‘distracted’ by the non-retributive promises of truth commissions, like healing, reconciliation or 
monetary compensation. My fieldwork reveals that commissions have restructured their 
investigation methods to respond to the persistent advocacy of trials (Peru) or have found 
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themselves severely criticized for failing to respond to this demand (Chile). While it is true that 
many politicians, military leaders and armed groups have accepted the creation of truth 
commissions under the impression that those panels would replace, or distract from, 
prosecutions, commissions have neither advocated impunity nor dampened the energies of 
activists who sought trials. The failure to prosecute has resulted from many other factors, but not 
from the existence of truth commissions.  
Conclusion 
This paper conceptualizes truth commission impact as a set of political, institutional, 
societal and judicial transformations resulting from the truth commission process in the course of 
a political transition. The discussion above discards several hypotheses about the relationship 
between truth commissions and political, social and judicial change: vetting (effective only in El 
Salvador), reconciliation through consensus, and impunity through distraction. It qualifies other 
hypotheses: judicial impact tends to appear several years after the commission’s termination, in 
great part as a result of broader changes in politicians’ and judges’ attitudes on human rights 
trials; and impunity through amnesty favors only a small subsection of perpetrators, while the 
overall climate of impunity is likely caused by factors other than truth commissions’ amnesty 
procedures. The delegitimation, reaction to delegitimation and impact on social norms 
hypotheses draw support, but the evidence for truth commission impact is suggestive rather than 
conclusive, since a host of contextual factors produce political and societal normative changes in 
conjunction with, and inseparable from, the effect of truth commissions. Therefore I provide an 
account of these causal processes in my case studies of Chile and Peru, but not in the cross-
national comparison of 15 truth commissions.  
The processes that generate the greatest impact are immediate political impact and 
delayed political impact through civil society mobilization. The former points to the quasi-
official character of truth commissions, while the latter is a reminder of the need for continued 
civil society activism to keep politicians accountable to otherwise non-binding 
recommendations. Civil society mobilization is a crucial factor in generating judicial and 
normative impact, as well. Truth commissions are neither state institutions nor NGOs; their 
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liminal position vis-à-vis public authorities necessitates a broader discussion of their agency and 
vulnerability, stated goals and unanticipated consequences. It is through the relations of mutual 
cooperation and competition, autonomy and dependence, legitimation and delegitimation 
between politicians, domestic and international human rights activists, and commissioners that 
truth commissions generate policy and normative impact.  
Notes
 
1
 Not all accounts assess commissions’ worth in terms of political outcomes. The investigation of human rights 
violations and remembrance of the past in an institutionalized setting may be desirable and morally defensible 
independently of political transformations (Booth 2001; Allen 2001), which I discuss elsewhere in the book. This 
chapter is, however, is devoted to truth commissions’ impact on politics and society.  
2
 Since the early days of transitional justice scholarship, the specific applications of a state’s duty to prosecute have 
fuelled disagreements. See Arthur (2009) for a summary of the debates on the duty to prosecute at the 1988 Aspen 
Institute Conference, one of the meetings that framed the field of transitional justice.  
3
 Examples include, but are not limited to, Wilson 2001; Long and Brecke 2003; Brahm 2006; Rodio 2009. 
4
 Charles D. Kenney, and Dean E. Spears, “Truth and Consequences: Do Truth Commissions Promote 
Democratization?” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Washington, D.C. (September 1-4, 2005); Hun Joon Kim, and Kathryn Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect 
of Human Rights Prosecutions for Transitional Countries.” International Studies Quarterly, 54 (2010): 939–963; 
Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies: The Impact on Human Rights and 
Democracy, (New York: Routledge, 2009); Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne and Andrew G. Reiter, Transitional 
Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy, (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2010). 
5
 David Mendeloff (2004) cites several Amnesty International reports to conclude that truth commissions do not contribute to 
human rights progress, while González, de Brito, and Aguilar Fernández (2001) put into question the democracy-promotion 
effects of truth commissions based on four case studies.  
6
 “The capacity of truth commissions to promote reconciliation is far more limited than their proponents suggest. 
Truth commissions contribute to democratic consolidation only when a prodemocracy coalition holds power in a 
fairly well institutionalized state. Absent those conditions, truth commissions can have perverse effects, sometimes 
exacerbating tensions and at other times providing public relations smoke screens for regimes that continue to abuse 
rights.” (Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003, 20). Also see: Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010, 137. 
7
 For example, the payment of reparations is an important step for the progress of transitional justice, but the meager 
amounts allocated to individual victims put into question the actual success (Schlein 2010).  
8
 In some other cases, the presumed perpetrators have admitted to the social legitimacy of the truth commission, and 
faced the strategic (and moral) choice to obstruct, ignore or participate in the truth-finding process. Especially non-
transitional truth commissions have seen an increasing willingness on the part of perpetrators to make confessions or 
present their accounts before truth commissions or similar truth-finding bodies. In other words, major disagreements 
about the truth commission both reflect and structure societal polarization around the human rights issue. 
9
 In Guatemala, Bishop Juan Gerardi was assassinated in April 1998, soon after the publication of a church-backed 
human rights report under his direction. In Peru, threats against the truth commission staff, most notably against its 
president Salomón Lerner, have been reported to this day. 
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10
 James L. Gibson (2004) stands out in clearly explaining the causal mechanism for how historiography may have 
promoted attitudes toward reconciliation in the context of the South African transition. The publication of historical 
facts by the truth commission creates cognitive dissonance in individual and group perceptions of apartheid. The 
need to mitigate “collective dogmatism” forces individuals to rethink their past actions and to renounce earlier self-
justifications that stated political conflict in terms of absolute evil and absolute good.  
11
 I do not assume that mere exposure to an idea leads to its automatic internalization. My modest assumption is that 
awareness of a truth commission’s work (as opposed to no exposure whatsoever) increases a person’s likelihood of 
adopting its central message.  
12
 “In transitional justice circles, the indistinction between forgiveness and amnesty has been rendered murkier by 
the fact that the one instance where binding amnesty decisions were made by a truth commission, South Africa, was 
also an instance where the idiom of forgiveness played a central role” (Saunders 2011, 125).  
13
 The temptation to establish truth commissions as a means to avoid justice has provoked normative debates over 
the nature of the relationship between truth, justice and reconciliation. Juan Méndez (2001) argues against the 
counterpoising of truth and justice, as well as reconciliation and justice, as binary opposites. Instead, he claims: 
“Truth commissions are important in their own right, but they work best when conceived as a key component in a 
holistic process of truthtelling, justice, reparations, and eventual reconciliation” (Méndez 2001, 29). Likewise, 
Ernesto Verdeja (2009) resists the appropriation of reconciliation as a pretext for impunity and amnesia. He argues 
for a notion of reconciliation understood as “mutual respect among former enemies” that implies truth telling, 
accountability, victim recognition and the rule of law as fundamental tenets.  
14
 ICTY Prosecutor Carla del Ponte, for instance, helped stop formation of a truth commission for Bosnia because 
she feared such a commission would undermine her judicial cases (Call 2004, 112 footnote 14). 
15
 I do not claim that not instituting a truth commission would facilitate consensus-building. As the example of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina suggests, the absence of societywide truth-telling procedures might delay reconciliation 
further, as widely divergent accounts of why a violent conflict started, and who the perpetrators were, inhibit 
dialogue and consensus between ethnic and political groups (Kostic 2008). 
16
 Data available at: http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/index.htm 
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